The Trans–Saharan Gold Trade (7th–14th century)

Gold Trade and the Kingdom of Ancient Ghana
Around the fifth century, thanks to the availability of the camel, Berber-speaking people began crossing the Sahara Desert. From the eighth century onward, annual trade caravans followed routes later described by Arabic authors with minute attention to detail. Gold, sought from the western and central Sudan, was the main commodity of the trans-Saharan trade. The traffic in gold was spurred by the demand for and supply of coinage. The rise of the Soninke empire of Ghana appears to be related to the beginnings of the trans-Saharan gold trade in the fifth century.

Leaders of the ancient kingdom of Ghana accumulated wealth by keeping the core of pure metal, leaving the unworked native gold to be marketed by their people.

From the seventh to the eleventh century, trans-Saharan trade linked the Mediterranean economies that demanded gold—and could supply salt—to the sub-Saharan economies, where gold was abundant. Although local supply of salt was sufficient in sub-Saharan Africa, the consumption of Saharan salt was promoted for trade purposes. In the eighth and ninth centuries, Arab merchants operating in southern Moroccan towns such as Sijilmasa bought gold from the Berbers, and financed more caravans. These commercial transactions encouraged further conversion of the Berbers to Islam.

 Increased demand for gold in the North Islamic states, which sought the raw metal for minting, prompted scholarly attention to Mali and Ghana, the latter referred to as the "Land of Gold." For instance, geographer al-Bakri described the eleventh-century court at Kumbi Saleh, where he saw gold-embroidered caps, golden saddles, shields and swords mounted with gold, and dogs' collars adorned with gold and silver. The Soninke managed to keep the source of their gold (the Bambuk mines, most notably) secret from Muslim traders. Yet gold production and trade were important activities that undoubtedly mobilized hundreds of thousands of African people. Leaders of the ancient kingdom of Ghana accumulated wealth by keeping the core of pure metal, leaving the unworked native gold to be marketed by their people.

Gold Trade and the Mali Empire
By 1050 A.D., Ghana was strong enough to assume control of the Islamic Berber town of Audaghost. By the end of the twelfth century, however, Ghana had lost its domination of the western Sudan gold trade. Trans-Saharan routes began to bypass Audaghost, expanding instead toward the newly opened Bure goldfield. Soso, the southern chiefdom of the Soninke, gained control of Ghana as well as the Malinke, the latter eventually liberated by Sundiata Keita, who founded the Mali empire.

Mali rulers did not encourage gold producers to convert to Islam, since prospecting and production of the metal traditionally depended on a number of beliefs and magical practices that were alien to Islam. In the fourteenth century, cowrie shells were introduced from the eastern coast as local currency, but gold and salt remained the principal mediums of long-distance trade.

The flow of sub-Saharan gold to the northeast probably occurred in a steady but small stream. Mansa Musa's arrival in Cairo carrying a ton of the metal (1324–25) caused the market in gold to crash, suggesting that the average supply was not as great. Undoubtedly, some of this African gold was also used in Western gold coins. African gold was indeed so famous worldwide that a Spanish map of 1375 represents the king of Mali holding a gold nugget.

When Mossi raids destroyed the Mali empire, the rising Songhai empire relied on the same resources. Gold remained the principal product in the trans-Saharan trade, followed by kola nuts and slaves. The Moroccan scholar Leo Africanus, who visited Songhai in 1510 and 1513, observed that the governor of Timbuktu owned many articles of gold, and that the coin of Timbuktu was made of gold without any stamp or superscription.

HISTORY OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The people of sub-Saharan Africa: 2000 - 500 BC
Much of the southern part of the African continent is occupied by tribes known as Khoisan, characterized by a language with a unique click in its repertoire of sounds. The main divisions of the Khoisan are the San (often referred to until recent times as Bushmen) and the Khoikhoi (similarly known until recently as Hottentots). The tropical forests of central Africa are occupied largely by the Pygmies (with an average height of about 4'9', or less than 1.5m). But the Africans who will eventually dominate most of sub-Saharan Africa are tribes from the north speaking Bantu languages.
The Bantu languages probably derive from the region of modern Nigeria and Cameroon. This western area, bordering the Gulf of Guinea, is also the cradle of other early developments in African history. Iron smelting is known here, as in other sites in a strip below the Sahara, by the middle of the 1st millennium BC. And the fascinating but still mysterious Nok culture, lasting from the 5th century BC to the 2nd century AD, provides magnificent pottery figures which stand at the beginning of a recognizably African sculptural tradition.
Probably during the first millennium BC, tribes speaking Bantu languages begin to move south. They gradually push ahead of them the Khoisan, in a process which will eventually make the Bantu masters of nearly all the southern part of the continent. Meanwhile, in the regions immediately south of the desert, the first great kingdoms of sub-Saharan Africa become established during the first millennium AD.
The trading kingdoms of West Africa: 5th - 15th c.
A succession of powerful kingdoms in West Africa, spanning a millennium, are unusual in that their great wealth is based on trade rather than conquest. Admittedly much warfare goes on between them, enabling the ruler of the most powerful state to demand the submission of the others. But this is only the background to the main business of controlling the caravans of merchants and camels. These routes run north and south through the Sahara. And the most precious of the commodities moving north is African gold.
The first kingdom to establish full control over the southern end of the Saharan trade is Ghana - situated not in the modern republic of that name but in the southwest corner of what is now Mali, in the triangle formed between the Senegal river to the west and the Niger to the east. Ghana is well placed to control the traffic in gold from Bambuk, in the valley of the Senegal. This is the first of the great fields from which the Africans derive their alluvial gold (meaning gold carried downstream in a river and deposited in silt, from which grains and nuggets can be extracted).
Like subsequent great kingdoms in this region, Ghana is at a crossroads of trade routes. The Saharan caravans link the Mediterranean markets to the north with the supply of African raw materials to the south. Meanwhile along the savannah (or open grasslands) south of the Sahara communication is easy on an east-west axis, bringing to any commercial centre the produce of the whole width of the continent. While gold is the most valuable African commodity, slaves run it a close second. They come mainly from the region around Lake Chad, where the Zaghawa tribes make a habit of raiding their neighbours and sending them up the caravan routes to Arab purchasers in the north.
Other African products in demand around the Mediterranean are ivory, ostrich feathers and the cola nut (containing caffeine and already popular 1000 years ago as the basis for a soft drink). The most important commodity coming south with the caravans is salt, essential in the diet of African agricultural communities. The salt mines of the Sahara (sometimes controlled by Berber tribes from the north, sometimes by Africans from the south) are as valuable as the gold fields of the African rivers (see Salt mines and caravans). Traders from the north also bring dates and a wide range of metal goods - weapons, armour, and copper either in its pure form or as brass (the alloy of copper and zinc).
Ghana and its successors: 8th - 16th century
Ghana remains the dominant kingdom of West Africa for a very long period, from well before the 8th century to the 13th. The prosperity resulting from its activities is evident in the town of Jenne - by800 already a thriving town on the Niger. In the 13th century the gold field of Bure, on the upper reaches of the Niger, becomes more important than Bambuk. The shift in economic power is followed by a political change when a warrior by the name of Sundiata conquers Ghana and establishes the even more extensive kingdom of Mali - stretching from the Atlantic coast to beyond the Niger.
In the 15th century the western trade route through the Sahara to Morocco declines in importance, and a central one up to Tunis carries more of the desert trade. This change prompts the decline of the Mali kingdom - to be replaced for a while by another power further to the east, that of the Songhay people. Their capital is the city of Gao, built on both banks of the Niger downstream of the great curve in the river. At the end of the 16th century Gao too loses its dominant position. By then a new foreign power is establishing a presence on African coasts, with a new religion, Christianity. But the Christians are four centuries behind the Muslims in penetrating these regions.
Islam in east Africa: 8th - 11th century
Africa is the first region into which Islam is carried by merchants rather than armies. It spreads down the well-established trade routes of the east coast, in which the coastal towns of the Red Sea (the very heart of Islam) play a major part. There is archaeological evidence from the 8th century of a tiny wooden mosque, with space enough for about ten worshippers, as far south as modern Kenya - on Shanga, one of the islands offshore from Lamu. Shanga's international links at the time are further demonstrated by surviving fragments of Persian pottery and Chinese stoneware.
By the 11th century, when Islam makes its greatest advances in Africa, several settlements down the east coast have stone mosques. At Kilwa, on the coast of modern Tanzania, a full-scale Muslim dynasty is established at this period. Coins from about 1070 give the name of the local ruler as 'the majestic Sultan Ali bin al-Hasan'. Three centuries later the Muslim traveller Ibn Batuta finds Kilwa an extremely prosperous sultanate, busy with trade in gold and slaves. In the 20th century Muslims remain either a majority or a significant minority in most regions of the east African coast. But the early penetration of Islam is even more effective down the caravan routes of west Africa.
Islam in west Africa: 8th - 11th century
From the 8th century Islam spreads gradually south in the oases of the Sahara trade routes. By the 10th century many of the merchants at the southern end of the trade routes are Muslims. In the 11th century the rulers begin to be converted. The first Muslim ruler in the region is the king of Gao, from about the year 1000. The ruling classes of other communities follow suit. The king of Ghana, the most powerful realm, is one of the last to accept Islam - probably in the 1070s.
The effect of Islam on African communities, with their own strong traditional cultures, is a gradual process. In 1352 Ibn Batuta visits Mali. He is impressed by the people's regularity in saying their prayers, but he looks with stern disapproval at certain practices which are more evidently African. He particularly frowns upon performances by masked dancers, and on the tendency of women to walk about in an unseemly shortage of clothing.
Mali is famous throughout the Islamic world at the time of Ibn Batuta's visit, because only a generation earlier its ruler has astonished Cairo by his wealth. In 1324 Mansa Musa, the sultan of Mali, decides to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. His richly attired retinue and his heavily laden animals reflect his financial status - for he effectively controls the African gold trade which now supports the currency not only of Islamic states but of European communes and kingdoms. (The most valuable coins of Roman Catholic Europe have until recently been minted in silver, but Genoa, Florence and Venice reintroduce gold in the late 13th century and northern kingdoms soon follow their example.)
Contemporary accounts say that when Mansa Musa passes through Cairo, on his way to Mecca, his caravan numbers 60,000 people and his camels carry 12 tons of gold. He distributes largesse to religious institutions and to fawning courtiers alike. Indeed he is so generous with the abundant gold of Mali that the value of the metal in Cairo suffers a temporary slump. But the reputation of Africa and its wealth is securely established.
The forest kingdoms of west Africa: 11th - 15th c.
The great trade routes to the north, through the kingdoms first of Ghana and then of Mali and Gao, gradually provide a market for the produce of the forest regions of west Africa. Unlike the open savannah of the northern kingdoms, the conditions of life in the tropical rain forest make it difficult for small communities to coalesce into more powerful states. But one such state emerges among the Yoruba people during the 11th century. It is Ife, famous now for its sculpture (see the Sculpture of Ife and Benin). Lying west of the Niger and just within the border of the forest (in present-day Nigeria), Ife has the economic advantage of being close to a gold field.
In the 15th century Ife is eclipsed by a neighbouring kingdom, Benin, lying a little to the southeast and further into the forest. Rule from Benin city is established by a warrior king, Ewuare, over a forest region some seventy-five miles in extent. When the Portuguese arive, in 1486, they are greatly impressed by many elements of Benin. They are struck by the sophistication of life in the royal palace. They admire the efficiency of the administration. But most of all they marvel, as the world has continued to marvel, at the brass sculptures of Benin - in a realistic tradition deriving from the nearby example of Ife (see the Sculpture of Ife and Benin).
Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe: 11th - 15th c.
The plateau between the rivers Zambezi and Limpopo, in southeast Africa, offers rich opportunities for human settlement. Its grasslands make excellent grazing for cattle. The tusks of dead elephants provide an easy basis for a trade in ivory. A seam of gold, running along the highest ridge, shows signs of having been worked in at least four places before 1000 AD. The earliest important trading centre is at Mapungubwe, on the bank of the Limpopo. The settlement is established by a cattle-herding people, whose increasing prosperity leads to the emergence of a sophisticated court and ruling elite.
In 1075 the ruler of Mapungubwe separates his own dwelling from those of his people. He moves his court from the plain to the top of a sandstone hill, where he rules from a palace with imposing stone walls. It is the first example of the zimbabwe of this region - a word in Shona, the local Bantu language, meaning literally 'stone houses'. Zimbabwe become the characteristic dwellings of chieftains, and about 100 hilltop ruins of this kind survive. Easily the most impressive is the group known as Great Zimbabwe, which in the 13th century succeeds Mapungubwe as the dominant Shona power - with a kingdom stretching over the whole region between the Limpopo and the Zambezi.
Great Zimbabwe is not close to the local gold seam, but its power derives from controlling the trade in gold. By this period mine shafts are sunk to a depth of 100 feet. Miners (among them women and children) descend these shafts to bring up the precious metal. As much as a ton of gold is sometimes extracted in a year. The buildings of Great Zimbabwe are evidence of equally great labour. Massive stone walls enclose a palace complex with a great conical tower, while impressive dry-stone granite masonry is used in a fortress or acropolis at the top of a nearby hill. The buildings date from the 13th and 14th centuries, the peak of Great Zimbabwe's power.
In the 15th century Great Zimbabwe is eclipsed by two other kingdoms, one to the south at Khami (near modern Bulawayo) and one to the north, near Mount Darwin. This latter kingdom is established by a ruler who is known as the Munhumutapa - a title adopted by all his successors. The Munhumutapa is the potentate of whom word is sent home to Europe by new arrivals on the African coast in the early 16th century. His court is first reached by a Portuguese traveller in about 1511

Ancient Africa Trade Routes

The trade routes of Ancient Africa played an important role in the economy of many African Empires. Goods from Western and Central Africa were traded across trade routes to faraway places like Europe, the Middle East, and India.

What did they trade?

The main items traded were gold and salt. The gold mines of West Africa provided great wealth to West African Empires such as Ghana and Mali. Other items that were commonly traded included ivory, kola nuts, cloth, slaves, metal goods, and beads.

Major Trade Cities

As trade developed across Africa, major cities developed as centers for trade. In Western Africa the major trade centers were cities such as Timbuktu, Gao, Agadez, Sijilmasas, and Djenne. Along the coast of North Africa sea port cities developed such as Marrakesh, Tunis, and Cairo. The port city of Adulis on the Red Sea was also an important trade center.

Routes Across the Sahara Desert

The major trade routes moved goods across the Sahara Desert between Western/Central Africa and the port trade centers along the Mediterranean Sea. One important trade route went from Timbuktu across the Sahara to Sijilmasa. Once the goods reached Sijilmasa they might be moved to many places including the port cities of Marrakesh or Tunis. Other trade routes included Gao to Tunis and Cairo to Agadez.

Caravans

Traders moved their goods across the Sahara in large groups called caravans. Camels were the main mode of transportation and were used to carry goods and people. Sometimes slaves carried goods as well. Large caravans were important because they offered protection from bandits. A typical caravan would have around 1,000 camels with some caravans having over 10,000 camels.

The Camel  

The camel was the most important part of the    caravan. Without the camel, trade across the Sahara would have been next to impossible. Camels are uniquely adapted to survive long periods without water. They also can survive large changes in body temperature allowing them to withstand the heat of the day and the cold of night in the desert.

History

Camels were first domesticated by the Berbers of North Africa around 300 CE. With the use of camels trade routes began to form between cities across the Sahara Desert. African trade reached its height, however, after the Arabs had conquered North Africa. Islamic traders entered the region and began to trade for gold and slaves from Western Africa. The trade routes remained an important part of the African economy throughout the Middle Ages until the 1500s.

Interesting Facts about the Trade Routes of Ancient Africa

• Before a trip across the desert, camels would be fattened up to prepare for the journey.
• The religion of Islam was spread throughout Western Africa through Muslim traders.
• Islam helped to encourage trade because it lowered crime rates through Islamic law and also provided a common language (Arabic).
• Muslim traders who lived in West Africa became known as the Dyula people and were part of the wealthy merchant caste.
• Camels have a double row of eyelashes to protect their eyes from the sand and the sun. They can also close their nostrils to keep out the sand.
• It took the typical caravan around 40 days to cross the Sahara Desert moving at around 3 miles per hour.

THE CONCEPTS OF INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL COHESION

The concept of individuality or individual freedom is fundamental in determining human life in society for it underlies human thought and behavior.¹ Individuality co-exists with social cohesion, which in turn is a basic component of human life in society. They constitute a dichotomy, without any essential opposites.
As social factors, both concepts exist in the particular epoch of a peoples' existence though in subtly differing relationships. In African traditional society social cohesion was dominant over individuality; unlike individuality, it seems to have been distinctly discernible. But the order of dominance was natural, that is, society evolved in this manner with social harmony rather than tension or crisis between the two.

In contemporary Africa there is a deliberate coercive tendency against individuality in the attempt to build a cohesive harmonious society and realize nation unity.² Despite its inherent oppression, this has been the foundation of nation building, since the imposition of European colonial rule. The coercion, in turn, provokes reaction in form of resistance, both physical and psychic, thus causing a crisis between social cohesion and individuality.

The thesis of this paper is, first, to examine the concepts of both individuality and social cohesion in African traditional society or culture and, second, to show how these ideas are influencing contemporary African thought, particularly among the political leadership. This influence manifests a perversion by the political leadership of two African cultural realities, namely, individuality and social cohesion, and the will of the individual to restore the status quo of the traditional society.


DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPTS
Individuality may be referred to as metaphysical freedom. According to David Bidney this is the autonomous power of choice and decision of will as essential conditions for the exercise of other freedoms.⁴ Individuality is the essence of a human being, notwithstanding any form of constraint, control or influence; it is inherent in human nature and survives any form of external influence to one's self or conscience.

Social cohesion is a state of affairs whereby individuals in the society consistently pursue certain fundamental virtues on the basis of enhancing a common or social good. In the African traditional sense this is called African communalism. D.N. Kaphagawani calls it the social structure which pervades traditional Africa in which every member voluntarily cooperates. Each is proud and much obliged to help any other member of his or her community.

The two concepts are dichotomous because individuality sometimes tends towards enhancement of the freedom that entails pursuit of egoistic or selfish interests, that is, negative individualism. On the other hand the social good tends to submerge such freedom. But both concepts are not essentially opposites or antagonistic because if individual freedom is rationally pursued, that is, pursued responsibly or with a sense of duty so as to safeguard the good or what is beneficial to others, it does not contradict the social good. At this level the individual is normatively free.

Bidney calls normative freedom that according to which human action is directed by rational ideals and conforms to rational laws and principles. It presupposes that a rational man makes his own decisions as to how to act in the context of values and standards of his society which are prior to his existence in the society. Thus, one's demand for freedom of conscience and thought depends directly upon recognition of the power of reason to conceive valid ideals of what ought to be done and what can be realized in action. In this normative sense freedom is responsibly pursued. Responsible freedom is the basis of social cohesion, and in African traditional society education played a vital role inculcating this freedom among members of society.


TRADITIONAL SOCIETY
The Role of Traditional Education
In African traditional society through the system of education an individual was brought up to respect the values and standards of his society. Education was the basis of inculcating social and moral values; it pervaded the entire framework of the social system and was the instrument for socialization.
Virtue, defined in terms of a social ethic, was the ultimate aim of traditional education in Africa. The normative dimension found here a very definite expression, being primarily concerned with social and moral values.

The cultivation of social and moral values and hence enhancement of social cohesion played a dual fundamental role. First, it enabled society to be held together; great value was placed upon communal fellowship in the traditional society, which fellowship infused African social life with a pervasive humanity and fullness of life.⁹ This state of affairs entailed psychological integration of the people and hence enhanced social unity. Second, the social cohesion was instrumental in society's evolution which involved positive inner social and institutional changes. These changes have occurred over time and they provided opportunity for social challenges to ensure social order, integrity and the present and future survival of the society"

Authoritarianism in African Traditional Society
Notwithstanding the basic values of African communalism, there were clear (indirect) coercive elements inherent in it. There was epistemological and political authoritarianism. Wiredu states that authoritarianism refers to any human arrangement which entails any person being made to do or suffer something against his will, or if it leads to any person being hindered in the development of his own will. He qualifies this conception by saying that what is authoritarian is the unjustified overriding of an individual's will.

Kaphagawani says that epistemological authoritarianism was rampant in traditional Africa precisely because the elders were the only ones held to have all knowledge and wisdom, so that what they said had to be believed without questioning.¹¹ This epistemological advantage the elders had over the rest of the community ensued into a political advantage or political authoritarianism,¹² from which emerged the core of political leadership in the traditional society. These elders claimed to know what was good or right for the society so their ideas were imposed on the non-elderly. Because of their assumed superiority in knowledge and wisdom as well as political authority and power, they assumed the position of Plato's philosopher kings. Their dual authoritarianism was excessive. They unjustifiably overrode the will of the non-elderly. The authoritarian tendency, a form of indirect coercion, was inimical to the growth of individuality. Though it was a means of social control, it denied the non-elderly a critical appraisal of the social system, hence, deprived them a cognitive active participation in it.

THE STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE AFRICAN
TRADITIONAL SOCIETY
Nonetheless, Kaphagawani says, to assert African communalism (and the authoritarianism of the elders) is not in any way to imply that traditional Africa knows no concept of the individual. Africans of the independent existence of each and every person in their communities. In fact African communalism presumes pluralism in that it is essentially a voluntary pooling together of independent and differing efforts and capabilities that makes the African communal life what it is. Moreover the young are not ontologically less human than the elders. According to Tempels, the name is the very reality of the individual.

Moreover, the overriding of the will of the non-elderly was a kind of benevolent authoritarianism. The elders were not rulers but wise leaders or guardians who were safeguarding the interests of society, that is the good of every individual and therefore order and harmony, which ensured social security and a worthy life for the individual. Besides, in their leadership they were open to everybody; they do not hide behind the institutions they formed such as monopolistic political parties characteristic of the contemporary world. The elders lived up to their status as philosopher kings for after a long period of continuous education they acquired considerable social wisdom.

The fact of the reality of the common or social good and the willingness of the individual to subscribe to it implied a dialogue between the individual and the society. A person was not compelled to be a conformist to the social ethic but was expected to have a moral obligation to behave in a manner that would enhance the social ethic. This moral principle could be analogous to Kant's categorical imperative, i.e., "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a general natural law."

Accordingly, in order to ensure cultivation of the moral obligation among the individuals, coercive social institutions were an exception rather than a rule. So while the individual was morally bound to promote the common good, society had a moral obligation to ensure the integrity of the individual. Therefore, both society and the individual were bound to each other.
Despite the virtuousness of African communalism sometimes there were dissenting voices among the individuals, especially from among the non-elderly, due to the elders' authoritarianism. The fact of dissension can be maintained by the existence of the concept and practice of punishment in the traditional society.

INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL COHESION IN
CONTEMPORARY LIFE
The epistemological and political authoritarianism filters into the modern state in Africa. Though some of the African contemporary leaders are not elders, they assume the superior knowledge and wisdom of the traditional elders. The colonial system facilitated usurpation of the authority and power of the traditional elders by the contemporary political leaders. Colonial control and education led to the emergence of a new social and political elite in the African society from among the non-elderly. They were those who accepted the new system, i.e., the colonial system, and collaborated with or helped the colonial regime to sustain it in Africa. Over the time their social and political status was enhanced while that of the elders withered. They then with the struggle for political independence took up the political platform and thus assumed political leadership.

In the post-independent state, under the guise of socialist ideology to realize the common good or social cohesion and also under pseudo democracy, the contemporary leaders impose their ideals and ideas on the people. Through epistemological and political manipulation they invoke the virtues of African communalism. Africa has had abundance of examples of such leaders who in the name of the common good have established `democratic' institutions at the apex of which there is a single political party in which `freedom of expression' is guaranteed. This political monopoly has been the rule rather than exception in post-colonial Africa. It has enabled several presidents to be `elected' to power for several consecutive terms of office. Hence, democracy has always been manipulated in their favor.

The authoritarianism entailed in such monopolistic political system has always inevitably led to a conflictual climate, i.e., conflict between the state and the individual. Thus Africa has witnessed growth of political liberal movements; Africa today is experiencing the liberal tide of the 19th century Europe which was directed against the political control of the monarchs who were the `wise' men of Europe at that time.
In contemporary Africa the ethic of African communalism is an ideal beneath African socialism. Ideally African socialism anticipates a revolutionary change to redress economic and social imbalances in African countries which resulted from European colonialism; African socialism is regarded an antecedent to social cohesion.<sup>15</sup> However, African socialism in its contemporary context is founded on authoritarianism; the ideology is developed by political leaders who have over the years in the post-colonial state assumed epistemological and political authoritarianism and have not allowed the citizens adequate means to express their interests, ideas and values. The will of the people has been assumed and `choice' made for them; conformity is forced on the people. In this case the people have been denied political freedom, i.e., real participation in the political process.

The authoritarian political behavior of the leaders negates their ethical legitimacy in society. It erodes the dignity of the individual and becomes a basis of his perpetual unhappiness. Consequently a perpetual, though sometimes illusive, antagonism between the individuals and the society or state ensues. This conflict parallels the social harmony that results from the natural social evolution.

The conflict between the individual and the state is not only a phenomenon of the African world. It is also a social and political crisis which is an inevitable consequence of man's attempt to organize society and establish institutions to ensure a way of doing things. The problem of crisis arises when the attempt is not ethically motivated, that is, when it is not genuinely intended for a common good.

The behavior of the political leadership in contemporary Africa has eroded the moral base of the socialist ideology. Instead of playing its role as "a set of ideas about what form a good society should take,"¹⁶ it is used as an instrument for political propaganda and unjustified manipulation of the people as a means for the `philosopher kings' to realize their interests, i.e., political monopoly, a monopoly which is politically and socially unhealthy.

In contemporary Africa the manipulation of the people is greatly facilitated by their ignorance. They lack formal education on codified knowledge, and they also lack political consciousness. In many instances, the manipulation is supported by the use of military force. Under such circumstances, where wisdom has been put aside, political authority and power lacks valid foundation as was the case in the traditional society. Thus it is inherently fragile and bound to disintegrate.

CONCLUSION
The validity of the paper in view of the proposed thesis ought to be evaluated on the following observations. First, the paper emphasizes that in the African traditional society there was a moral imperative or obligatory commitment among the people to the virtue of social good which greatly facilitated social cohesion, and thus enabled growth of a viable society. This moral trait was fundamentally based on society's recognition of the status of the individual, namely, his individual freedom, notwithstanding certain constraints to that freedom. Second, as a consequence of the first, society was devoid of the inherent social crisis that results from tension between individual freedom and society interests. Third, the harmonious link between the individual and society that was a feature of the African traditional society has been perverted by the contemporary African political leadership. This led to deep social or political crisis in Africa between the state and the individual. This perhaps is the greatest tragedy of Africa's political life today. Social cohesion in contemporary Africa is a nightmare.

Communalism and Socialism in Africa:

Kwarne Nkrumah - 'African Socialist'

...when the time comes and the history of international socialism and the revolution to overthrow capitalism is written at the head of course will be names like Marx, there will be names like Engels, there will be the name of Lenin. But a place will have to be found for Kwame Nkrumah...

CL.R. James, Accra, 1960.

This declaration by CL.R. James, one-time associate of Leon Trotsky, was remarkable. Not since the panegyrics to Stalin had individuals been greeted with such extravagant language. Even more amazing was the elevation of a man whose 'contribution'; to socialism was nationalist, traditional and communalist, and whose message to other African leaders was:

Aim for the attainment of the Political Kingdom that is to say, the complete independence and self-determination of your territories. When you have achieved the Political Kingdom all else will follow...But this power which you will achieve is not in itself the end...Coupled with this will to independence is an equal desire for some form of African union...within the milieu of a social system suited to the traditions, history, environment, and communalistic pattern of African society.

(Hands off Africa!, Accra, 1961)

James soon tired of Nkrumah and his eccentricities, and sought new African leaders to place on the pedestal alongside Marx and Engels. Yet it was the career of Nkrumah, who caught the imagination of socialists throughout Europe, that needs discussion if there is to be an understanding of this crucial phase in the life of C.L.R.

On 6 March 1957, Kwame Nkrumah, founder and leader of the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), became Prime Minister in the newly named state of Ghana. On the same day the book, Ghana: the Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, was published and, whether intended or not, for the next ten years the names of Ghana and Nkrumah were always coupled together. Then, in 1966, Nkrumah was toppled in a bloodless coup and went into exile. Whether his name will be added to that of Marx, Engels, Lenin , … must be doubted. James was reflecting the adulation shown the man in 1960, when African news figured prominently in the left-wing press and the career of Kwame Nkrumah was followed avidly, not only because of events in that small corner of west Africa, but because commentators believed that something new always comes of Africa, and this was the newest of all the new things to shake the world.

Nkrumah's political aims could be found in his many publications, all carrying the same message. Ghana was to be a socialist state based on social justice and democracy. Not the socialism of Marx, he said, but a socialism with a strong moral base to bring real justice to the people of Africa. All this would be achieved through the assertion of the 'African Personality` which will allow us in the future to play a positive role and speak with a concerted voice in the cause of peace and for the liberation of dependent Africa and in defense of our national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity' (quoted in Woddis, 1963, p.119).

Socialists in Europe and America who applauded the way in which he had campaigned since 1951, when the CPP won its first electoral success, were fulsome in their praise of the first socialist state in Africa. There were some reservations, but most commentators were prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt. There was further optimism in socialist quarters 18 months later when Sékou Touré, an 'African Socialist' and former trade union leader persuaded the people of Guinea to vote against entry to the proposed French Community. Touré who had once had connections with the French communist Confédération Génerale des Travailleurs, rejected the class struggle - which only divided the people in the struggle against colonialism. In line with Franz Fanon, he declared that the most exploited sectors of society were the peasants and women, and not the workers. As for the latter, Touré announced in 1958 that he would institute forced labour...for the benefit of those who are going to work themselves' (quoted in Andrain, p. 172).

There was nothing in what Touré said that fitted with Marx’s thoughts, but here too the voice of critics was stilled. In fact, so great was the sympathy for Guinea, where the departing French administrators had destroyed every available amenity, from telephones to toilets, that Touré 's stance came to symbolize the forces of anti-colonialism. Then, when he turned to Moscow for aid and secured the co-operation of Nkrumah, his standing among western socialists rose. The signing of an agreement on 1 May 1959 to unite Ghana and Guinea brought paeans of praise from socialist writers.

There might have been some doubts when the terms of the agreement between these states became known. There was no statement on social policy, and no sign of socialism in the new union. That was not all. Six weeks later, President Tubman of Liberia - known more for the tyranny of his regime and his rejection of socialism -joined Presidents Nkrumah and Touré in setting up a loose federation of West African states under the terms of the Sanniquellie Declaration.

If there were reservations about some of Nkrumah's activities there was consolation for the defenders of African Socialism, as the new ideology was named. In April 1958 Nkrumah convened a conference of the eight independent African states at which there was a declaration of loyalty to the UN, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung. Resolutions were affirmed condemning colonialism, calling for a just end to the war in Algeria, for the granting of independence to all trusteeship territories, for an end to racism in South Africa, Kenya, the Central African Federation and so on. This was followed by the All-Africa Peoples Conference in December attended by governments and non-governmental bodies from across the continent. There were calls for the liberation of the Continent, the building of a Commonwealth of Free African States and the use of all means short of violence to secure these aims. 'The slogan 'Africa for the Africans' became the battle cry of the gathering. Most of the known African personalities were present and many made their first public appearance. One delegate who achieved prominence in the months to come was Patrice Lumumba who returned home to Leopoldville (Belgian Congo) to address an ecstatic crowd. The enthusiasm with which socialists greeted these leaders makes strange reading today. However, it would be wrong to ignore the mood of the time. History was being made, they all declared: Africa was on the march, new centres of socialist struggle were opening up which would take up the fading spark in Europe and light up the world.

Nkrumah was never out of the news for long. Modiba Keita of Mali joined with Ghana and Guinea in a new union of supposedly socialist states which formed the nucleus of the Casablanca group. This 'vanguard' for progress in Africa, which gave full support to Lumumba, included Morocco, Egypt, Libya (under King Idris) and the National Liberation Front of Algeria. Lumurnba, whose martyrdom excludes any possibility of knowing what he might have achieved, was the adoptive darling of the left and an additional name for the champions of socialism in Africa to revere.

In a period just short of five years the enthusiasm for African Socialism spread among radical groups. Those that raised critical voices were sectarian, dogmatic, scholastic, or just foolish. How could anyone dare to question the credentials of Nkrurnah, Touré, Keita, Ben Bella, Lumumba or Felix Moumié of the Cameroons? Had they not gone into the countryside and won mass support, organised their fellow countrymen into mass movements (or a revolutionary army in Algeria), had they not embarked on campaigns that humbled the imperialist powers? Were they not champions of world peace and opponents of the atom bomb. Did they not condemn apartheid, revile the Belgians, support the Algerians in their battles? Even Nasser joined the ranks of the near-socialists. He had rid Egypt of a corrupt monarchy, nationalized the Suez Canal, withstood the assault of Britain France and Israel, and joined the Casablanca group. Why, he even turned to Moscow for aid and assistance in building the Aswan dam, and that alone qualified him for the appellation: socialist.

What if these erstwhile socialists imprisoned opponents, shackled trade unions, banned strikes, outlawed communist parties? These had to be accepted as part of the price of liberation, as the necessary consequence of the struggle against imperialism. Had the masters not said that 'freedom was the understanding of necessity.' Idris Cox of the British Communist Party could not find praise enough for Nkrumah. He described his book Consciencisin as a 'creative contribution in the field of philosophy, in the application of Marxism to the specific conditions of Africa.' His considered opinion was that:

Because Nkrumah sought to translate Marxism into African terms it gave the African peoples something which belonged to them, a scientific outlook which can guide them on the march towards socialism. Not only was it an enrichment of Marxism. It also served to demonstrate that Marxism is not a rigid dogma, but a guide to action, and a beacon light which illuminates the path to socialism (Cox, p.88).

Publications from Moscow were only slightly less enthusiastic. Academician I. Ia. Potekhin, as quoted by D. Morrison, declared that the CPP programme included not only the demand for the elimination of imperialism and oppression, but also the liquidation of capitalist exploitation and the building of a socialist society (p.89). In a final accolade, when Potekhin met Nkrumah in December 1962 he said of him, and of Keita, that they were `scientific socialists'.

There were several features copied from the USSR that appealed to Stalinists. The new 'socialist' societies were all one-party states presided over by dominant leaders, all claimed to exercise democratic centralism, all co-opted trade unions into the state structure and outlawed strikes, and several introduced five- or seven-year plans and state farms in imitation of the USSR. Furthermore, they condemned colonialism and imperialism, welcomed aid from and tended to side with the USSR on cold-war issues, and supported the causes approved by Moscow: for the FLN, for Lumumba, for Nasser, against apartheid and against the regimes in East Africa and the Rhodesias.

Significantly, none of the Stalinist writers mentioned the influence on Nkrumah of George Padmore (see Searchlight South Africa No.2) or of C.L.R. James, who had become a close associate of Padmore and was a champion of pan-Africanism. They were not only present in Accra, speaking, advising, exhorting. their activities and opinions played an important part in establishing Nkrumah's place in Africa.

James and the African'Revolution'

CL.R. James, born on 4 January 1901 in Trinidad, was an early protagonist of West Indian self-government. In 1932 he moved to Britain and was profoundly affected by his reading of Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution. He joined a Trotskyist group in the British Independent Labour Party in 1933/4 and proposed at this stage that the black people could only achieve freedom by revolutionary means. Angered by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 he joined with Padmore and others in forming a propaganda group, the International African Friends of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian army was faced with might of a technologically superior army and was forced to surrender; but black opinion had been aroused. The led to the formation of the International African Bureau [IAB] to supply information on affairs in Africa and agitate for self-determination. George Padmore was President of the IAB and James, who was editor of the IAB journal, remained in Trotskyist groups and states that he 'worked on the application of Marxist and Leninist ideas to the coming African revolution' (James, 1977, p.64.) Remarkably, the `Marxism' that James offered Africa was devoid of the internationalism that he demanded for the European revolution.

Within a decade ideas propounded by Padmore, and the black intellectual, WEB. DuBois inside the Pan-African movement, led to changed orientations on Africa. James now said that the leading role of the proletariat in effecting change was scrapped as was the need for armed struggle to effect change (ibid, pp.74-5). Precisely when James 'saw the light' is not certain. In his writings before the war he concentrated on the history of the slave revolt in San Domingo, and what he wrote about Africa consisted of gobbets, some true, many erroneous, on local uprisings in African colonies. At no point did he stop to place these events in their social setting, and although he said it was not his aim to show that Africans were capable of revolt, this was precisely what he seemed to be doing (James, 1939).

James straddled two political philosophies: that of nationalism in his African writings, and that of Marxism in his writings on Europe. His statements in discussion with Trotsky in 1940 indicates that he did not manage to reconcile them. He wanted Trotskyist support for the IBA journal, but without mention of socialism; he sought a black organization in the USA which included all classes and agitated for the advancement of all blacks (James, 1980). Trotsky disagreed with James on these points, but he did stress again, as he had done in earlier discussions with members of the American left opposition, that American blacks should be given full support if they expressed a desire for their own independent state. Eventually James accepted this and it could only have reinforced his own nationalist inclinations.

James eventually left the Trotskyist movement in 1950, by which time he had extended the views developed in the Pan-African movement. There was no need for revolution anywhere in the world. The masses had demonstrated their ability for self-organization and this would come to permeate all society. All that was needed was for organizers to spread the word. The new proponent of this philosophy, in James's view, was Kwame Nkrumah. Thus it was, that in July 1960 James could deliver his tribute, an extract from which heads this article. But it was also a speech of self-glorification. If Nkrumah was to be raised to the Gods, there was to be no uncertainty about who had placed him there. I quote:

My friends, I want to tell you: I have written, and there are people here who know it, a history of the Communist International. It begins with the study of Marx. It went on to the study of the Second International which originated and was inspired by Engels, and it went on to make a close study of the Third international which was established by Lenin. I want to say here and I want to say it most emphatically that when the time comes and the history of international socialism and the revolution to overthrow capitalism is written at the head of course will be names like Marx, there will be names like Engeh, there will be the name of Lenin. But a place will have to be found for Kwame Nkrumah...[drowned by applause and shouts]. I state, as one who has studied the history of the revolutionary movement, that at the present time those policies that I have enunciated for you, those policies that you know spring from here are fundamental policies for the emancipation of all classes and all oppressed people in the world. And that today- I don't say yesterday, I don't say tomorrow, but I say today, the centre of the world revolutionary struggle is here in Accra, Ghana ... [Loud applause]

Although James was to change his mind about Nkrumah - for whom a place would apparently not have to be found alongside Marx, Engels and Lenin; he nonetheless had the essay reprinted in the collection of essays in 1962, which went through four printings by 1977. The tone of the passage, and much more in the essay, is distasteful; but if the boasting is put aside, it is not easy to reconcile James's elevation of personalities with his claims to Marxist analysis. This 'cult of the individual' (If that phrase has any meaning) is more befitting to the Stalin cult that James had once condemned. Nor did James expand on the ideas that Nkrumah was supposed to have contributed (alongside Marx, Engels and Lenin), and he did not indicate how the new state of Ghana had become the 'centre of world revolutionary struggle; whatever revolutionary struggle meant for him.

James began to have his doubts about Nkrumah's policies in the early 1960s: views he communicated in letters to the President, but Nkrumah did not deign to reply. The book on Ghana, says James, was concluded at a time when he 'feared for the future of Africa under African auspices, a fear which was immediately justified by the fall of Nkrumah' (James, 1977, p.24). Another God had faded and in James's favour it must be said that he distanced himself from the coming downfall where others continued in their praise of this failed leader. But for some unstated reason James does not discuss the roles played by Touré, or Keita, or any of the other 'socialist' leaders in Africa. The dream had been shattered and James only wanted to distance himself from what had happened. But aid was at hand. James continued:

My bewilderment, however, was almost immediately soothed by the appearance of the Arusha declaration of Dr Nyerere. Before very long, on my way to lecture at Makerere, I was able to pass into Tanzania and read, hear and see for myself what was going on. I remain now, as I was then, more than ever convinced that something new has come out of Africa,

Step up Comrade Nyerere and take your place alongside Marx, Engels, Lenin ... and Nkrumah?

The Roots of Ideology

These writings of James on Africa, muddled and wrong, are all the more objectionable for their concentration on individuals who come to personify the state. Nkrumah had claimed that the CPP was Ghana and Ghana was the CPP. James equated Nkrumah with the CPP and when the leader failed to build the new society, James found a new leader for Africa in east Africa. The same personification was found elsewhere. Discussions of Guinea were converted into appraisals of Touré ; Mali into a sketch of Keita; Algeria into a backdrop of Ben Bella. It was the ideas of these men that were quoted ad nauseam: plans for their countries, the meaning of socialism, their conception of democracy, the role of the trade unions, the attitude to peace, to neutralism, to African unity. This substitution of the party for the people and the leader for the party was a phenomenon that had taken root under Stalinism. It had taken hold in ever wider circles of writers who chose to ignore the social setting in which events occurred and ascribed success to charisma. As if a God-like favour was all that was needed to explain the emergence of particular leaders.(2)
The one factor common to colonial Africa was the predominance of the rural population. There were regions of these territories in which the colonial administration had been largely absent and where control was maintained through indirect rule. There were other districts in which the heavy hand of Commissioners was always apparent. But few regions were insulated from the needs and demands of the cash market, and there was widespread discontent in almost every colony. It is not always clear whether the aspiring leaders set out to capture the rural constituencies, or whether the process was reversed. In at least one well researched area, in the Kwilu district of what was the Belgian Congo, it is obvious that it was the radicalized rural population that forced the urban based leaders to advance ever more radical slogans. (Weiss, passim).
To attract this vast constituency national leaders adopted tribal dress, used ceremonial libations, shook fly whisks, sang tribal songs, adopted tribal titles. They preached the virtues of the rural communalism: Nyerere extolled the mutual security of the rich and the poor, in which the community ensured the welfare of its members. This was supposed to have pre-existed colonialism and he called it the communitary society. Touré spoke of the communaucratic society with a 'unique humanism...in collective living and social solidarity. 'In regions 'contaminated by colonialism, personal egoism abounded, but otherwise 'an individual in Africa cannot conceive of the organization of his life outside that of the family, village or clan. The voice of the African is faceless and nameless' (quoted in Cowan, p.193). Nkrumah harked on the same theme. Communalism, he wrote, involved the African:

as primarily a spiritual being, a being endowed originally with a certain inward dignity, integrity and value...[Socialism] includes the restitution of the egalitarian and humanist principles of traditional African life within the context of a modem technological society serving the welfare needs of its people (Mohan, p.232).
The worker was viewed differently. Fanon, Senghor, Mboya, Touré and others inveighed against a 'privileged minority, a 'selfish privileged group', who played little part in overthrowing colonialism. Nyerere said of them that after independence they 'displayed a capitalist attitude of mind' demanding a greater share in the general income because of the contribution they made. (Mohan, p245) Attitudes differed, but African leaders were agreed that socialism did not involve working class control of production: some because they said the working class was minute (and in this they were often factually correct) or because they claimed that the workers were selfish. Behind much of this rhetoric came the claim that there were no class divisions in Africa, and no class struggle. Touré claimed that his party had 'adapted from Marxism everything that is true for Africa' and had 'excised' the class struggle 'to permit all Africans regardless of class to engage in the anti-colonial struggle’. (Cowan, p.189). Elsewhere he said that the party had 'formally rejected the principle of the class struggle...' as a European inspired doctrine that was not relevant to Africa (ibid).

These arguments were repeated by leaders in east and in central Africa. I have not been concerned with the truth or falsity of the claims for `traditional society', but with the fact that African leaders rested their cases on such statements and that James did not refute them. This is remarkable: James knew full well that Engels had said of the utopian socialists that their theories were constructed during the 'immature phase of capitalist production' when class positions were correspondingly inchoate. Their answers were utopian and 'the more their details are elaborated, the more they necessarily recede into pure fantasy (Engels, pp23,285).

Such fantasy led Nkrumah to the conclusion that capitalism was `too complicated a system for a newly independent nation. Hence the need for a socialist society.' Others were more cavalier in their discussion of economic problems: 'You cannot be a capitalist when you have no capital' said Sedou Kouyate, Mali’s Minister of Planning and Rural Development - without explaining how planning or rural development was possible without capital. Other Ministers used the arguments once advanced by the Narodniki in Czarist Russia: Capitalism led to fratricidal struggle, to degradation and social injustice, to personal enrichment. It was in this tradition that Nkrumah was to write in Consciencism that 'the presuppositions and purposes of capitalism are contrary to those of African society. Capitalism would be a betrayal of the personality and conscience of Africa' (see also Mohan, pp.221-2).

This word spinning circumvented the need to confront real problems. These phrases provided no means to secure development in industry or in agriculture, and no way to find food for the population. The 'personality and conscience of Africa' was a myth that brought neither capital nor socialism to Ghana, did not solve its inter-regional rivalries, did not appease the Ashanti cocoa growers, did not provide the aluminium plant that Nkrumah tried to secure, and did not save him from the popular wrath.

A more extensive essay would show that similar fates were waiting for other states that claimed they could build socialism in their little states, without resources, without capital, and without a working class. Their failure could have been anticipated by Marxist thinkers - and if local leaders did not have the understanding of what was required, they were unfortunate in not finding the advisers they needed. Of James it must be said that he more than any others, should have been better prepared to explain the problems critically. His great disservice was to give political mysticism the sanction of an apparent Marxist radicalism.

The problems of the 1960s,.when James, played a central role in Pan African politics, are of more than historic interest. The theoretical confusion of the left when confronted with class struggles in backward societies goes back to the polemics in Russia before the revolution of 1917: an issue resolved in practice but leaving a legacy of theoretical confusion. The struggles for colonial independence were denied the insights that Marxism should have offered, Instead, mysticism prevailed and populist theories replaced scientific analysis.

Description of Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics

Aimed at both the intelligent layman and the professional economist, and written in language that both can understand, this book is the most comprehensive and intellectually powerful explanation of the nature and value of laissez-faire capitalism that has ever been written. It represents a twofold major integration of truths previously discovered by other writers, combined with numerous original contributions made by the author himself. Within economic theory, it integrates leading ideas of the Austrian school with needlessly abandoned doctrines of the British classical school. It further integrates such reconstituted economic theory with essential elements of Ayn Rand's philosophy of Objectivism. (The Austrian school has been the main school of procapitalist economic thought since 1871; von Mises is its most important member, followed by Böhm-Bawerk. The British classical school was the main school of procapitalist economic thought prior to 1871; Adam Smith and David Ricardo are its most important members.)

On the foundation of these integrations, Dr. Reisman is able to develop the numerous major original contributions that the book presents on the subjects of profits, wages, saving, capital accumulation, aggregate economic accounting, monopoly, and natural resources, among other vital subjects. Based on the same foundation, the book presents the most powerful critiques of Marx, Keynes, the pure-and-perfect competition doctrine, and environmentalism to be found anywhere.
A leading part of its trenchant economic analysis is a consistent demonstration of the natural harmony of the rational self-interests of all men under capitalism—of businessmen and wage earners, of consumers and producers, of men of all races and nationalities, including immigrants and the native born, and of competitors of all levels of ability—consonances most will find astonishing, given the prevailing misunderstandings of capitalism in the present day.

The book's importance and appeal to a general audience are evident in its description of prevailing attitudes toward capitalism and its challenge to learn why they are all completely wrong and the cause of self-destructive political behavior on a massive scale. For those with the intellectual courage to accept a challenge of having many of their firmest and most cherished beliefs reduced by unanswerable logic to the status of Dark-Age superstitions, here are some of the beliefs that Reisman's book demolishes: The profit motive is the cause of starvation wages, exhausting hours, sweatshops, and child labor; of monopolies, inflation, depressions, wars, imperialism, and racism. Saving is hoarding. Competition is the law of the jungle. Economic inequality is unjust and the legitimate basis for class warfare.

Economic progress is a ravaging of the planet and, in the form of improvements in efficiency, a cause of unemployment and depressions. War and destruction or additional peacetime government spending are necessary to prevent unemployment under capitalism. Economic activity other than manual labor is parasitical. Businessmen and capitalists are recipients of "unearned income" and are "exploiters." The stock and commodity markets are "gambling casinos"; retailers and wholesalers are "middlemen," having no function but that of adding "markups" to the prices charged by farmers and manufacturers; advertisers are inherently guilty of fraud—the fraud of attempting to induce people to desire the goods that capitalism showers on them, but that they allegedly have no natural or legitimate basis for desiring. (These are all common accusations that are bandied about again and again ad nauseam, in the media, in novels and plays, in classrooms and lecture halls.)

On the basis of such mistaken beliefs, Reisman shows, "people turn to the government: for ‘social justice'; for protection and aid, in the form of labor and social legislation; for reason and order, in the form of government ‘planning.' They demand and for the most part have long ago obtained: progressive income and inheritance taxation; minimum-wage and maximum-hours laws; laws giving special privileges and immunities to labor unions; antitrust legislation; social security legislation; public education; public housing; socialized medicine; nationalized or municipalized post offices, utilities, railroads, subways, and bus lines; subsidies for farmers, shippers, manufacturers, borrowers, lenders, the unemployed, students, tenants, and the needy and allegedly needy of every description."

Reisman's book flies in the face of all such anticapitalistic ideas and demands. Its thesis is that never have so many people been so ignorant and confused about a subject so important, as most people now are about economics and capitalism. It argues that in its logically consistent form of laissez-faire capitalism—that is, with the powers of government limited to those of national defense and the administration of justice—capitalism is a system of economic progress and prosperity for all, and is a precondition of world peace. Following an exhaustive economic analysis of virtually every aspect of capitalism, the book's concluding chapter is devoted to the presentation of a long-range political-economic program for the achievement of a fully capitalist society.
Because its advocacy of capitalism is based in large measure on the author's own, original contributions to economic theory, this is a book that the professional economist can profit from as much as the general reader. For it is sure to constitute as wide and profound a challenge to the theoretical preconceptions of today's economists as it does to the political preconceptions of today's laymen.

Almost the length of a volume of the Encyclopedia Britannica in terms both of number of pages and content per page, the book incorporates in little more than three of its twenty chapters an updated and expanded version of the material presented in Dr. Reisman's previous book The Government Against the Economy.
Simply put, Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics is the philosophically and intellectually strongest book in the defense of laissez-faire capitalism that can be found anywhere in the world at the present time. It is state of the art in economic theory and political philosophy. At the same time, however, it can serve as a textbook (introductory, intermediate, or advanced), in which capacity it provides a complete and effective alternative and antidote to what is taught in such texts as Samuelson and all the Samuelson clones and will educate professors as well as students.

The intelligent, open-minded reader who seeks to understand the economics and politics of the modern world (along with much of its closely related history and social and cultural phenomena), and what is required to improve mankind's lot in these two vital areas, need look no further than to this book. Reading it is an essential requirement for understanding and improving the modern world.

Capitalism

Capitalism,” a term of disparagement coined by socialists in the mid-nineteenth century, is a misnomer for “economic individualism,” which Adam Smith earlier called “the obvious and simple system of natural liberty” (Wealth of Nations). Economic individualism’s basic premise is that the pursuit of self-interest and the right to own private property are morally defensible and legally legitimate. Its major corollary is that the state exists to protect individual rights. Subject to certain restrictions, individuals (alone or with others) are free to decide where to invest, what to produce or sell, and what prices to charge. There is no natural limit to the range of their efforts in terms of assets, sales, and profits; or the number of customers, employees, and investors; or whether they operate in local, regional, national, or international markets.

 

The emergence of capitalism is often mistakenly linked to a Puritan work ethic. German sociologist Max Weber, writing in 1903, stated that the catalyst for capitalism was in seventeenth-century England, where members of a religious sect, the Puritans, under the sway of John Calvin’s doctrine of predestination, channeled their energies into hard work, reinvestment, and modest living, and then carried these attitudes to New England. Weber’s thesis breaks down, however. The same attitudes toward work and savings are exhibited by Jews and Japanese, whose value systems contain no Calvinist component. Moreover, Scotland in the seventeenth century was simultaneously orthodox Calvinist and economically stagnant.

A better explanation of the Puritans’ diligence is that by refusing to swear allegiance to the established Church of England, they were barred from activities and professions to which they otherwise might have been drawn—landownership, law, the military, civil service, universities— and so they focused on trade and commerce. A similar pattern of exclusion or ostracism explains why Jews and other racial and religious minorities in other countries and later centuries tended to concentrate on retail businesses and money lending.
In early-nineteenth-century England the most visible face of capitalism was the textile factories that hired women and children. Critics (Richard Oastler and Robert Southey, among others) denounced the mill owners as heartless exploiters and described the working conditions—long hours, low pay, monotonous routine—as if they were unprecedented. Believing that poverty was new, not merely more visible in crowded towns and villages, critics compared contemporary times unfavorably with earlier centuries. Their claims of increasing misery, however, were based on ignorance of how squalid life actually had been earlier. Before children began earning money working in factories, they had been sent to live in parish poorhouses; apprenticed as unpaid household servants; rented out for backbreaking agricultural labor; or became beggars, vagrants, thieves, and prostitutes. The precapitalist “good old days” simply never existed (see industrial revolution and the standard of living).

Nonetheless, by the 1820s and 1830s the growing specter of child labor and “dark Satanic mills” (poet William Blake’s memorable phrase) generated vocal opposition to these unbridled examples of self-interest and the pursuit of profit. Some critics urged legislative regulation of wages and hours, compulsory education, and minimum age limits for laborers. Others offered more radical alternatives. The most vociferous were the socialists, who aimed to eradicate individualism, the name that preceded capitalism.
Socialist theorists repudiated individualism’s leading tenets: that individuals possess inalienable rights, that government should not restrain individuals from pursuing their own happiness, and that economic activity should not be regulated by government. Instead, they proclaimed an organic conception of society. They stressed ideals such as brotherhood, community, and social solidarity and set forth detailed blueprints for model utopian colonies in which collectivist values would be institutionalized.

The short life span of these utopian societies acted as a brake on the appeal of socialism. But its ranks swelled after Karl Marx offered a new “scientific” version, proclaiming that he had discovered the laws of history and that socialism inevitably would replace capitalism. Beyond offering sweeping promises that socialism would create economic equality, eradicate poverty, end specialization, and abolish money, Marx supplied no details at all about how a future socialist society would be structured or would operate.
Even nineteenth-century economists—in England, America, and Western Europe—who were supposedly capitalism’s defenders did not defend capitalism effectively because they did not understand it. They came to believe that the most defensible economic system was one of “perfect” or “pure” competition. Under perfect competition all firms are small scale, products in each industry are homogeneous, consumers are perfectly informed about what is for sale and at what price, and all sellers are what economists call price takers (i.e., they have to “take” the market price and cannot charge a higher one for their goods).

Clearly, these assumptions were at odds with both common sense and the reality of market conditions. Under real competition, which is what capitalism delivered, companies are rivals for sales and profits. This rivalry leads them to innovate in product design and performance, to introduce cost-cutting technology, and to use packaging to make products more attractive or convenient for customers. Unbridled rivalry encourages companies to offer assurances of security to imperfectly informed consumers, by means such as money-back guarantees or product warranties and by building customer loyalty through investing in their brand names and reputations (see advertising, brand names, and consumer protection).

Companies that successfully adopted these techniques of rivalry were the ones that grew, and some came to dominate their industries, though usually only for a few years until other firms found superior methods of satisfying consumer demands. Neither rivalry nor product differentiation occurs under perfect competition, but they happen constantly under real flesh-and-blood capitalism.

The leading American industrialists of the late nineteenth century were aggressive competitors and innovators. To cut costs and thereby reduce prices and win a larger market share, Andrew Carnegie eagerly scrapped his huge investment in Bessemer furnaces and adopted the open-hearth system for making steel rails. In the oil-refining industry, John D. Rockefeller embraced cost cutting by building his own pipeline network; manufacturing his own barrels; and hiring chemists to remove the vile odor from abundant, low-cost crude oil. Gustavus Swift challenged the existing network of local butchers when he created assembly-line meatpacking facilities in Chicago and built his own fleet of refrigerated railroad cars to deliver low-price beef to distant markets. Local merchants also were challenged by Chicago-based Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward, which pioneered mail-order sales on a money-back, satisfaction-guaranteed basis.

Small-scale producers denounced these innovators as “robber barons,” accused them of monopolistic practices, and appealed to Congress for relief from relentless competition. Beginning with the Sherman Act (1890), Congress enacted antitrust laws that were often used to suppress cost cutting and price slashing, based on acceptance of the idea that an economy of numerous small-scale firms was superior to one dominated by a few large, highly efficient companies operating in national markets (see antitrust).
Despite these constraints, which worked sporadically and unpredictably, the benefits of capitalism were widely diffused. Luxuries quickly were transformed into necessities. At first, the luxuries were cheap cotton clothes, fresh meat, and white bread; then sewing machines, bicycles, sporting goods, and musical instruments; then automobiles, washing machines, clothes dryers, and refrigerators; then telephones, radios, televisions, air conditioners, and freezers; and most recently, TiVos, digital cameras, DVD players, and cell phones.

That these amenities had become available to most people did not cause capitalism’s critics to recant, or even to relent. Instead, they ingeniously reversed themselves. Marxist philosopher Herbert Marcuse proclaimed that the real evil of capitalism is prosperity, because it seduces workers away from their historic mission—the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism—by supplying them with cars and household appliances, which he called “tools of enslavement.”1 Some critics reject capitalism by extolling “the simple life” and labeling prosperity mindless materialism. In the 1950s, critics such as John Kenneth Galbraith and Vance Packard attacked the legitimacy of consumer demand, asserting that if goods had to be advertised in order to sell, they could not be serving any authentic human needs.2 They charged that consumers are brainwashed by Madison Avenue and crave whatever the giant corporations choose to produce and advertise, and complained that the “public sector” is starved while frivolous private desires are being satisfied. And having seen that capitalism reduced poverty instead of intensifying it, critics such as Gar Alperovitz and Michael Harrington proclaimed equality the highest moral value, calling for higher taxes on incomes and inheritances to massively redistribute wealth, not only nationally but also internationally.3
Capitalism is not a cure for every defect in human affairs or for eradicating all inequalities, but who ever said it was? It holds out the promise of what Adam Smith called “universal opulence.” Those who demand more are likely to be using higher expectations as a weapon of criticism. For example, British economist Richard Layard recently attracted headlines and airtime with a startling revelation: money cannot buy happiness (a cliché of song lyrics and church sermons).4 He laments that economic individualism fails to ensure the emotional satisfactions that are essential to life, including family ties, financial security, meaningful work, friendship, and good health. Instead, a capitalist society supplies new gadgets, appliances, and luxuries that arouse envy in those who cannot afford them and that inspire a ceaseless obsession with securing more among those who already own too much. Layard’s long-range solutions include a revival of religion to topple the secularism that capitalism fosters, altruism to obliterate selfishness, and communitarianism to supercede individualism. He stresses the need, near-term, for robust governmental efforts to promote happiness instead of the minimalist night-watchman state that libertarian defenders of capitalism favor. He argues that low taxes are harmful to the poor because they give government inadequate revenue to provide essential services to the poor. Higher taxes really would not harm the well-to-do, he says, because money and material possessions are subject to diminishing marginal utility. If such claims have a familiar ring, it is because Galbraith made the same points fifty years ago.

Virtually all the new criticisms of capitalism are old ones repackaged as stunning new insights. One example is the attack on “globalization” (the outsourcing of service, manufacturing, and assembly jobs to foreign sites where costs are cheaper). It has been denounced as union busting, exploitative, and destructive of foreign cultures, and is damned for the loss of domestic jobs and the resulting erosion of local tax revenues. Identical complaints were voiced two generations ago when jobs began flowing from unionized New England textile factories to nonunionized southern textile mills, and then to offshore sites such as Puerto Rico.

Another “new” line of attack on capitalism has been launched by law professors Cass Sunstein and Liam Murphy and philosophers Stephen Holmes, Thomas Nagel, and Peter Singer.5 They lament that in societies based on self-interest and private property, wealth earners oppose rising taxes, preferring to spend their money on themselves and leave inheritances for their children. This selfish bias leads to an impoverished public sector and to inadequate tax revenues. To justify governmental claims for higher taxes, these writers have revived an argument—attacking the legitimacy of private property and inheritance—that was advanced by institutionalist economists during the New Deal era. Government, they assert, is the ultimate source of all wealth, and so it should have first claim on wealth and earnings. “Is it really your money?” Singer asks, citing economist Herbert Simon’s estimate that a flat income tax of 90 percent would be reasonable because individuals derive most of their income from the “social capital” provided by technology and by protections such as patents and copyrights, and by the physical security afforded by police, courts, and armies rather than from anything they personally do. If the “fruits of capitalism” are merely a gift of government, it is an argument that proves too much. By the same logic, individuals might be enslaved if they were not protected by government, so conscription (servitude for a brief period) would be entirely unobjectionable, as would the seizure of privately owned land to turn it over to new owners if their uses would yield higher tax revenues—exactly the basis of a 2005 Supreme Court ruling on “eminent domain.”

Another persistent criticism of capitalism—the attack on corporations—harkens back to the 1930s. Critics like Ralph Nader, Mark Green, Charles Lindblom, and Robert Dahl focus their fire on giant corporations, charging that they are illegitimate institutions because they do not conform to the model of small-scale, owner-managed firms that Adam Smith extolled in 1776.6 In fact, giant corporations are fully consistent with capitalism, which does not imply any particular configuration of firms in terms of size or legal form. They attract capital from thousands (sometimes millions) of investors who are strangers to each other and who entrust their savings to the managerial expertise of others in exchange for a share of the resulting profits.
In an influential 1932 book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf A. Berle Jr. coined the phrase “splitting of the atom of ownership” to lament the fact that investment and management had become two distinct elements. In fact, the process is merely an example of the specialization of function or division of labor that occurs so often under capitalism. Far from being an abuse or defect, giant corporations are an eloquent testimonial to the ability of individuals to engage in large-scale, long-range cooperation for their mutual benefit and enrichment (see corporations).

As noted earlier, the freedoms to invest, to decide what to produce, and to decide what to charge have always been restricted. A fully free economy, true laissez-faire, never has existed, but governmental authority over economic activity has sharply increased since the eighteenth century, and especially since the Great Depression. Originally, local authorities fixed the prices of necessities such as bread and ale, bridge and ferry tolls, or fees at inns and mills, but most products and services were unregulated. By the late nineteenth century governments were setting railroad freight rates and the prices charged by grain elevator operators, because these businesses had become “affected with a public purpose.” By the 1930s the same criterion was invoked to justify price controls over milk, ice, and theater tickets. One piece of good news, though, is that a spate of deregulation in the late 1970s and the 1980s eliminated price controls on airline travel, trucking, railroad freight rates, natural gas, oil, and some telecommunications rates.

Simultaneously, from the eighteenth century on, government began to play a more active, interventionist role in offering benefits to business, such as tax exemptions, bounties or subsidies to grow certain crops, and tariff protection so domestic firms would devote capital to manufacturing goods that otherwise had to be imported. Special favors became entrenched and hard to repeal because the recipients were organized while consumers, who bore the burden of higher prices, were not.

Once safe from foreign competition behind these barriers to free trade, some U.S. producers—steel and auto manufacturers, for example—stagnated. They failed to adopt new technologies or to cut costs until low-cost, low-price overseas rivals—the Japanese, especially—challenged them for their customers. They responded initially by asking Congress for new favors—higher tariffs, import quotas, and loan guarantees—and pleading with consumers to “buy American” and thereby save domestic jobs. Slowly, but inevitably, they began the expensive process of catching up with foreign companies so they could try to recapture their domestic customers.

Today, the United States, once the citadel of capitalism, is a “mixed economy” in which government bestows favors and imposes restrictions with no clear or consistent principles in mind. As the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe struggle to embrace free-market ideas and institutions, they can learn from the American (and British) experience about not only the benefits that flowed from economic individualism, but also the burden of regulations that became impossible to repeal and trade barriers that were hard to dismantle. If the history of capitalism proves one thing, it is that the process of competition does not stop at national borders. As long as individuals anywhere perceive a potential for profits, they will amass the capital, produce the product, and circumvent the cultural and political barriers that interfere with their objectives.